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CLEVER CONTRABAND: WHY ILLINOIS’
LOCKSTEP WITH THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT GIVES POLICE AUTHORITY TO
SEARCH THE BOWELS OF YOUR VEHICLE
JASON COOPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
We have all heard about it – drugs in the tire wells,
money in the gas tank.1 Those who transport drugs can
get pretty brazen, hiding them in clever places; under
the hood,2 behind door panels,3 or even within spare
tires.4
Giving police the constitutional capability merely to
ask suspects to check these areas ensures the efficient
administration of justice.5 But what if, like most of us,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014. First and foremost, the author would like to
thank his wife, Chrystal Marie Cooper, for voluntarily enduring him during
his legal education. Additionally, the author would like to personally thank
Professor Timothy O'Neill for lending his extensive knowledge and spirited
debates to John Marshall night students during his exciting criminal
procedure course. Finally, the author would like to dedicate this comment to
Samuel Wilhelm Cooper:
the qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and impossible to
define as those which mark a gentleman. Those who need to be
told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play
and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against abuse of
power. The citizens safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal
with human kindness, who sees truth and not victims, who serves
the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task
with humility. – Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson.
With admiration, reverence, and love, thanks Pops.
1. See, e.g., In re Seizure of $82,000 more or less, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013
(2000) (discussing $24,000 of illegal drug proceeds in the battery case of the
defendants automobile, and another $82,000 floating in the gas tank); Blow
(New Line Productions 2001) (exhibiting how to “play it cool” on a trip through
customs).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (1978)
(hiding drugs under a car’s hood).
3. See, e.g., People v. Kats, 967 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(hiding drugs behind a car’s door panels).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (1990) (hiding
drugs in a spare tire).
5. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (explaining
that an overly technical consent doctrine would result in “considerable
inconvenience [to] legitimate searches”).
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you are not carrying drugs or contraband? Imagine
being pulled over for speeding and the officer requests
permission to search your vehicle for weapons or
contraband.6 Do you feel as though you could say no?
When you say yes, what have you given the officer
permission to do? Can he search between the seat
cushions? What about in locked containers nestled in
the trunk?
The answer is yes to both questions,7 but what is
especially surprising is that the answer remains the
same when the officer begins using tools to drill into
the door paneling or slash open tires.8
In most
jurisdictions, the officer gained a nearly unequivocal
license to search anywhere in your vehicle when you
consented to a search “for weapons or contraband.”9
The reason most jurisdictions allow such an
invasive search is that, in state and federal courts, the
resourceful trafficker is no longer the exception, but the
rule.10 In addition to becoming commonplace, this
ingenuity has replaced standard trafficking techniques
for a multitude of suppliers, including everyone from
the petty dealer to the most sophisticated drug
cartels.11 But the cops are not to be outmatched by the
robbers.
In reaction to prevalent pilferers, law
6. In fact, speeding is a relatively severe infraction considering you could
be pulled over for an improperly affixed license plate, defective taillight, or
even for having part of one of the vehicles tires cross the center line. See infra
note 67 (listing minor infractions police use to pull over suspects).
7. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369 (2003) (deeming
constitutional a search between a defendant’s seat cushions with his consent);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820, (1982) (deeming constitutional a
search through locked containers in a defendant’s trunk).
8. See Strickland, 902 F.2d at 943 (explaining that the search consented
to granted authority to inspect spare tire and subsequently undertaking a
remedial assessment of its type and weight provided authority to cut it open
where an automatic weapon and drugs were found). See also Kats, 967 N.E.2d
at 344 (holding that using a screw driver to remove door paneling was within
the scope of the defendant’s consent).
9. See infra Part II.B.3.b, notes 64-67 (discussing “reasonableness” as the
limiting principle of a defendant’s consent so long as police ask to check the
defendant’s vehicle “for contraband”).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999)
(listing cases among federal courts dealing with obscure hiding places in
vehicles); Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 344 (listing cases among state courts dealing
with obscure hiding places in vehicles).
11. As early as 2001, federal investigators even began confiscating
submarines filled with cocaine headed towards coastal states from Central
America. Michael S. Schmidt, To Smuggle More Drugs, Traffickers Go Under
the Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/americas/drug-smugglerspose-underwater-challenge-in-caribbean.html.
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enforcement officers are becoming craftier and finding
creative ways to search a vehicle’s most obscure hiding
places.12 Indeed, some state legislators have even
joined the fray, proposing legislation that would ban
hidden compartments.13
Justice Marshall once said, “an individual’s consent
to a search of the interior of his car cannot necessarily
be understood as extending to containers in the car.”14
But query: what result when the interior is being used
as a container? Under what circumstances can police
probe the inner most portions of your vehicle?
Conversely, what is the outer bounds of your consent
once given?
In People v. Kats,15 Illinois recently joined the
majority of states in holding, “as an issue of first
impression [that] a defendant’s consent to search his
vehicle and its contents for contraband extends to the
spaces behind interior door panels.”16 This comment
will discuss why Kats, a little known case, has larger
ramifications for the current search, seizure, and
accompanying consent doctrine, removing almost all
limitations.
In Part II, this comment will discuss the history of
the consent doctrine within the Fourth Amendment,
including the Automobile Exception, Terry Stops,
12. See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1999) rev’d on
other grounds, 203 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2000) (arguing that the cleverness of the
defendant’s hiding place was an indication valid consent had been granted
because there is no other reason defendant would have let police search an
area he knew contained contraband); United States v. Robinson, 6 F.3d 1088,
1092 (5th Cir. 1993) (reporting that, of one police officer’s more than 250 minor
traffic stops resulting in warrantless searches, all but four were premised
upon consent); United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (1990) (using
loose screws on door paneling and polices’ “subjective experience” as probable
cause to search within the door panel); KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 356 (LaFave, et al. eds., 13th ed. 2012) (citing cases where police
have parked their vehicles on the shoulder of the road to get oncoming
motorists to veer out of the way, inadvertently crossing the center line without
signaling).
These tactics have led to an enormous amount of searches whose
authority is rooted in consent. In 2007, the United States Department of
Justice conducted a study which reported that of the approximately eighteen
million drivers stopped for a minor traffic violation, over half had “consented”
to a search. MATHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2005 6 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Apr. 2007).
13. See Criminals Hiding Drugs In Secret Car Compartments, (WBNS Ohio
10tv television broadcast Feb. 27, 2012) (reporting on the legislative attempt
to outlaw custom made “hidden compartments” in Ohio).
14. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 254 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. People v. Kats, 967 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
16. Id. at 344.
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consent, and “lockstep,” and how each pertains to
searching hidden compartments within vehicles. Part
III will then survey the cases and arguments, ending
with a discussion of Illinois’ recent decision in Kats,
with a specific focus on whether consent to search a
vehicle extends to those intricate hiding places
discussed above. Part IV will propose ways the police
can use Kats to search within compartments, bending,
but not breaking, Illinois’ and the United States’
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Structure and Theories Behind
the Fourth Amendment
The current state of the consent doctrine under
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the
inevitable eventuality of centuries of loosening.17 The
Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”18
Originally, the Fourth
Amendment was born out of “new” English case law
recognized by James Madison at the framing of the
constitution.19 Like any good legal test, the amendment
has two main parts20 and two camps to debate the
meaning of each and the meaning of the Amendment as
a whole.21 A majority of the Court has always believed
17. Compare Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses,
26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1392-94 (1989) (discussing the adoption of the
amendment as a preventative measure on so called “general warrants” giving
the police unfettered ability to become a roving commission), with Timothy P.
O’Neill, Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops and Consent
Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 745, 757 (2009)
(discussing Illinois’ inability to construe the Fourth Amendment so that the
“manner” of a search or seizure makes its scope and intrusion violate the
terms of the Amendment).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 1391-94. Wasserman contends, and
many scholars agree, that the Amendment was a reaction to two things. Id.
First, it was Madison and Jefferson’s promise to the antifederalists at the
Virginia Convention, who were concerned about an overbearing federal
government. Id. Second, it was a response to an issue that parliament was
dealing with – so called “general warrants.” Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1067 (1765)).
20. The two clauses of the Amendment state:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, [clause 1] and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized [clause 2].
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH.
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that all searches without a warrant are “presumptively
unreasonable” (the “Warrant Preference” Theory).22 At
one time, a minority believed that whether a search is
reasonable had nothing to do with whether a warrant
will issue (the “Two Clause” Theory),23 but that position
never garnered complete control.24 And, the text of the
amendment itself does not provide clear answers about
its structure.25
Nevertheless, despite some debate, the Warrant
L. REV. 1468, 1473-1474 (1985) (discussing major inconsistencies in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and ultimately advocating for a complete overhaul
of the Amendment using two separate models); Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at
1389-90 (comparing the Warrant Preference Theory to the Two Clause
Theory).
22. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (explaining that all
warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating that “with minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part
of the Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable when made
without a magistrate’s authority expressed through a validly issued warrant”)
overruled by, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
This is one of the best ways to ensure the Amendment fulfilled the
initial role the antifederalists ascribed to it – ensuring a check on any
potential for an “overbearing government” by requiring that police commit to
writing the scope of their search before undertaken, and without the benefit of
hindsight. See U.S. v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (2007) (explaining that,
although the neutrality of a judge may be doubted, the practical reason for the
warrant requirement is simple: “it forces the police to make a record before the
search, rather than allowing them to conduct the search . . . in the expectation
that if [it] is fruitful a rationalization for it will not be difficult to construct,
working backwards”); Bradley, supra note 21, at 1473 (listing prominent cases
affirming that the Fourth Amendment was meant to ban “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate”).
Yet, even the majority who originally established the Warrant Preference
Theory became unhappy with it shortly after its formation. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971) (Harlan J., concurring) (calling for an
“overhauling” of the amendment as early as 1971).
23. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not by its terms
require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches
and seizures that are ‘unreasonable’”).
24. Bradley, supra note 21, at 1474.
25. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 1391.
Wasserstrom eventually
cautions against relying too heavily on the text of the amendment itself. Id.
Madison originally wrote the Amendment as one long clause (“the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated by warrants
issued without probable cause”). Id. Nevertheless, the Amendment was
proposed to the House of Representatives as two clauses, identical to its
structure today, which was struck down in favor of Madison’s one clause
version. Id. Yet, when the Amendment went to the Senate for approval, the
two-clause house proposal had mysteriously reappeared over Madison’s
original one clause version. Id. The proposal had somehow “smuggled” its
way back into the proposal without anyone noticing, proving that the framers
simply were not concerned with the Amendment’s exact language. Id.
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Preference Theory is by far the accepted construction.
Defendants may certainly argue that a search (for
example, of the bowels of their vehicle) was
‘unreasonable,’ however, under the current Court’s
edifice, even winning this battle seems likely to lose the
war.26 Instead, they start from the presumption of
unreasonableness, and it is up to the prosecution and
police to argue for a “warrant exception.”27
B. Three Relevant Exceptions to the Warrant
Presumption Giving Police the Authority to Access
Hidden Compartments: the Automobile Exception, a
“Terry Stop,” and Consent
Police generally rely on categorical exceptions to
the warrant requirement to search a vehicle to sidestep
the word “reasonable” in the current formulation.28
Three exceptions are relevant here: [1] the automobile
exception, [2] reasonable suspicion, and [3] consent.29
1. The Automobile Exception
First, the Court treats automobiles differently
under the Fourth Amendment than any other place.30
Generally, police do not need a warrant to search an
automobile, only probable cause.31 There are at least
three
distinct
justifications
for
sequestering
automobiles from other places or effects.32 The original
26. Bradley, supra note 21, at 1473.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1473-74 nn.22-44.
29. See infra Parts II.B.1 to II.B.3 (discussing the three exceptions and
detailing their progeny).
Beyond the exceptions listed, two possible
justifications remain to search obscure areas of a vehicle: probable cause and a
warrant. Id. However, assuming all other aspects of the search are adequate,
the Supreme Court has expressly stated that probable cause would justify
searching hidden compartments. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570 (stating that “if
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search . . . including a ‘probing search’ of compartments”) (internal
citations omitted). And, that they would treat a warrant similarly. Id.
(stating that “[t]he scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no
narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant
supported by probable cause”).
30. See generally Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per
curiam) (discussing the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s
privacy requirement).
31. Id.
32. See Steven D. Soden, Expansion of the “Automobile Exception” to the
Warrant Requirement: Police Discretion Replaces the “Neutral and Detached
Magistrate,” 57 MO. L. REV. 661, 666 (1992) (discussing the evolution of the
exception from exigency in Carroll and Chambers to the public places doctrine
in Coolidge).
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justification for the exception was exigency.33 Because
cars are permanently mobile, they always threaten the
preservation of evidence, as well as an investigating
officer’s safety.34 Then, in the post-Katz era, courts
arguing for a second justification reasoned that
automobiles were immune from the Amendment’s
protections, not because of exigency, but because they
operate almost exclusively in quintessential public
places - shared municipal roads.35 Finally, there is a
regulatory rationale: the numerous rules of the road
often require seizure “to protect public safety or to
facilitate the flow of traffic.”36 But no matter what the
rationale, the scope of the automobile exception and its
vestige is at least as broad as a warrant, had one
issued.37
2. Reasonable Suspicion (“Terry Stop” or “Stop and
Frisk”)
Armed with the Automobile Exception, law
enforcement could arguably search obscure places of a
vehicle with only a scintilla of probable cause.38 But
there is another reason the great majority of vehicle
searches are conducted without a warrant: a “Terry
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id.
35. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining that
society does not recognize an expectation of privacy for automobiles traveling
on public roads in plain view). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that GPS information gathered on a
vehicle over an extensive period of time and putting together a comprehensive
picture using an aggregation of data impinges upon an reasonable expectation
of privacy even though it is “expose[d] to the plain view of outsiders”).
36. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting) citing South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
37. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (explaining that
where police conducted a warrantless search of Ross’ trunk for contraband, the
proper scope of that search is whatever scope “a magistrate could legitimately
authorize by a warrant”).
38. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 (explaining the depth of the automobile
exception); Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570 (explaining the depth of the automobile
exception).
Indeed, even if searching the bowels of a vehicle is not within the scope
of a defendant’s consent, such a search may nonetheless be justified by
probable cause. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420 (holding that defendant’s consent
did not extend to behind a vehicles door paneling, but the officer’s observation
that screws were loose on the paneling provided probable cause to search
within the door).
But because most such searches are traffic stops involving either
reasonable suspicion or consent, see generally Zapata, 180 F.3d at 1243
(compiling cases), whether the same search would be justified by probable
cause is outside the scope of this comment.
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Stop” or “reasonable suspicion.”39 In a Terry Stop,
probable cause is not necessarily required in stopping
and searching an automobile – a slighter, more
reasonable intrusion can be justified by a
correspondingly smaller level of suspicion.40
Under Terry v. Ohio,41 a stop is constitutional if [1]
there exists a minimal level of suspicion upon the stop’s
inception, and [2] the scope of the officer’s resulting
actions
remain
“reasonably
related
to
the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place.”42 Although the common law in place at the time
of the Amendment indicated police did not need a
warrant for crimes committed in their presence,43 a
Terry stop is the principal justification for most traffic
stops.44
3. Consent
Once the police have initiated a stop under Terry’s
progeny, all that is left is to obtain consent. While
undertaking that task, two main issues arise: whether
the officer can request consent and if so, what regulates
the scope of the resulting consent.
a. Asking for consent, without more, is always
constitutional
Terry prevents the police from becoming a roving
commission as the result of a minor traffic infraction, or
worse, a mere pretext.45 But two cases definitively hold
39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing other ways
officers can conduct searches).
40. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (justifying “minimally intrusive” searches based on a “Terry
Stop”).
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
42. See Id. at 20 (discussing appropriate length of detention under the
Fourth Amendment).
43. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327-32 (2001) (discussing
the history of the Amendment and reasoning that police may arrest for minor
traffic violations, not because of the common law in place at the time of the
Amendment, but because police require certainty in the field).
44. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (applying Terry to
traffic stops). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976)
(holding that police do not need a warrant for searches subsequent to an
arrest). Either the Watson-Atwater combination or a Terry Stop (under
Berkemer) can provide authority for vehicle stops based on minor traffic
infractions. Watson discusses only arrests, not stop or detentions, a gap that
Terry fills.
45. But see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that because in most traffic stops the decision whether
to arrest or merely issue a citation is totally up to the discretion of the officer,
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that Terry does not bear on when and whether the
police can ask for consent, each addressing a separate
prong of Terry. First, in Whren v. United States,46 the
Court
“foreclose[d]
any
argument
that
the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends
on the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved.”47
Whren and subsequent decisions give
police unfettered discretion to stop a vehicle in
violation of any traffic law.48
In addition to Whren, the Court has also relegated
the next prong of Terry. Terry’s second prong asks
whether the scope of the stop was proper, given its
initial justification.49 In Illinois v. Caballes,50 the Court
definitively held that the interval of time elapsed
during the stop is the only factor considered under
Terry’s second prong.51 Whether the manner of the stop
(or any other aspect) elevated it to an unreasonable
intrusion under Terry has become immaterial.52 Thus,
once a stop is legally undertaken in accordance with
Terry’s first prong, a mere request to search a vehicle
the danger of “pretextual” arrests is high).
46. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
47. Id. at 813. Whren had made an illegal U-turn in front of police, who
proceeded to pull him over and find a brick of cocaine in his possession. Id. at
808-9. Whren argued that such stops should be subjected to objective
reasonableness or good faith, but the Court reasoned that the Equal Protection
Clause, and not the Fourth Amendment, barred selective enforcement or
pretextual stops. Id. at 813.
48. Id. See also Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 (holding that states are
constitutionally free to give police discretion to decide when to arrest a suspect
even where he only violated conceding minor license, proof of insurance, or
seatbelt regulations only punishable by a $50 fine).
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
50. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
51. Id. at 407. In Caballes, Illinois State Trooper’s stopped Caballes for
going six miles per hour over the speed limit. People v. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d
504, 506, (2003) vacated and remanded sub nom. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005). While lawfully stopped, the arresting Trooper requisitioned a
canine unit to conduct a drug sniff of Caballes’ vehicle. Id. This activity,
which was not in and of itself a search under the Fourth Amendment
according to United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984), led the
Troopers to Marijuana in Caballes’ truck which earned him a charge for drug
trafficking. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 508. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
police activity conducted during a lawful detention, which does not itself
violate the Fourth Amendment, by definition cannot “compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08.
52. Id. See also O’Neill, supra note 17, at 753 (arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court impermissibly put an end to Illinois complex “manner” test
under Terry’s scope prong, which attempted to regulate the stop based on, not
only the time period which the suspect was detained, but whether the officers’
actions “transformed the nature of the encounter from a routine citation stop
into a [more] general investigation of [wrongdoings]”).
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for contraband cannot transform a traffic stop into an
unconstitutional seizure under Terry’s second prong.53
To summarize, officers can stop a vehicle based on
nearly any traffic violation, and merely asking for
consent to search, without more, cannot violate the
Fourth Amendment. However, once consent is granted
the scope of the resulting stop is not limitless.54
b. The scope of consent is limited by what a reasonable
person would regard as the object of the search.
Because Terry’s progeny was reduced to only
govern the timing of a traffic stop, there remains a
need to balance two competing interests. There must
be some limit on the scope a defendant’s consent, but
he must also be free to consensually relinquish his
constitutional rights, including his Fourth Amendment
rights.55
Early consent doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment context is rooted in the Court’s case law on
confessions.56
Both consent and confessions require the Court to
find an apt, but judicially malleable, definition of
“voluntary.”57 In its earliest form, consent to a search
was voluntarily given when the prosecution could prove
that it was the result of “unconstrained choice by its
maker . . . free of implied or explicit coercion.”58 The
test was a “totality of the circumstances” assessment,
treated as a question of fact for the trier.59
In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,60 the Court specifically
emphasized that no one fact was controlling,61 and this
was especially true of the defendant’s subjective
knowledge of his right to reject an officer’s request.62
53. But see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 415 (Souter, J., dissenting) (claiming that
“the government [cannot] take advantage of a suspect’s immobility to search
for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention [which] has to be the
rule unless Terry is going to become an open sesame for general searches”).
54. See infra Part II.B.3.b (discussing the scope limitations on consensual
searches during traffic stops).
55. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
56. See id. at 224 (detailing the Court’s agony in trying to define what is
constitutionally “voluntary” in more than 30 confession cases).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 225-27.
59. Id. at 227.
60. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
61. Indeed, one of the factors assessed may be the cleverness of the hiding
spot itself. Dortch, 199 F.3d at 201 (explaining that “the defendant’s belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found” is a factor in evaluating whether
the consent was validly given).
62. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26. But see id. at 277 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the prosecution must prove that the defendant had
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The defendant was not required to know his right to
reject and the officer need not inform him of it.63
More recently, the watershed case for limitations
on a defendant’s consent is Florida v. Jimeno,64 where
the Court held that an officer acts within the consent
granted “when it is objectively reasonable for [him] to
believe that the scope of the suspect’s consent
permitted him to open a particular container within the
automobile.”65 But to get sweeping consent over the
entire vehicle, police must indicate that they are

knowledge of his right to reject consent before consent could ever be
“voluntary”). Several scholars contend that the defendant’s knowledge should
be the principal concern, as it is evident that any consent given when one is
carrying contraband must have been the result of coercion, except in the rarest
circumstances. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police
Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 187 (1991) (stating that “[w]hat is baffling
about consent to search is why it is ever given”; and asking “[w]hy should
anyone surrender to the police, perhaps without a whimper, an interest
recognized both practically and legally to be the first order and often resulting
in the discovery of evidence that incriminates the consenter?”). See also Marcy
Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2002)
(asking “[w]hy [would] someone ‘voluntarily’ consent to allow a police officer to
search the trunk of his car, knowing that massive amounts of cocaine are
easily visible there? The answer, I have come to believe, is that most people
don’t willingly consent to police searches”).
But see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (reasoning that a
defendant can voluntarily consent to a search of an area containing
contraband because “the reasonable person test presupposes an innocent
person [which] ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does
not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached”)
(internal citations omitted).
63. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32 (explaining that consent could not be
maintained as a useful tool of law enforcement if it turned upon the subjective
knowledge of the defendant; that consent does not require positive notification,
like Miranda warnings do; and, that consent need not be “knowing and
voluntary,” because it is not technically a “waiver” and does not bear on the
criminal trial like other “critical stages,” such as a post-indictment line-up or
interrogation).
The rule that a defendant need not be made aware of his right to reject
an officer’s request is an important difference between the Court’s consent and
confession jurisprudence. Compare id. (holding that defendant need not be
made aware of his right of rejection in the consent context), with Escobedo v.
State of Ill., 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964) (holding that “[w]ithout informing [the
defendant] of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of [an] accusation,
the police [cannot urge] him to make a statement”).
64. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
65. Id. at 249. In Jimeno, police suspected the defendant of drug
trafficking after overhearing his conversation arranging a drug transaction,
and subsequently detained him for failing to come to a complete stop at a red
light. Id. The Court reasoned that “objective reasonableness” was the
appropriate test because “the scope of a search is [adequately limited] by its
expressed object [and a suspect’s ability to] delimit the scope of the search to
which he consents.” Id. at 250-52.
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searching the vehicle “for contraband.”66 Jimeno’s
“objective reasonableness” is a limiting principle;
however, some argue it is a rubber stamp compared to
Schneckloth, or just another “foot in the door” like
Whren or Caballes.67
4. Illinois and the “Limited68 Lockstep” Doctrine
Despite the oft-repeated axiom that the Federal
Constitution creates a floor and not a ceiling, leaving
states free to add to the restrictions on their own
government,69 Illinois expressly chooses not to create its
66. See id. at 251 (requiring that “[t]he scope of a search [be] defined by its
expressed object”). However, police need not indicate which parts of the
vehicle will be subjected to their search, only its object. Id. at 255 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
67. See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 750 (claiming that Whren dismantled any
meaningful limitation Jimeno established because it lets police use things like
“[faulty] rear license plate light[s], driving 71 mph in a 65 mph zone, and a
defective brake light (which turned out not to be defective)” stand as sufficient
suspicion to justify a stop, arrest, and subsequent search). Indeed, Jimeno
himself was arrested subsequent to a minor traffic violation, but likely
because of the phone conversation arranging a drug transaction, overheard by
officers prior to the stop. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249.
Professor O’Neill appears to advocate for the pre-Caballes rule to be
reinstituted in Illinois: that both the time and manner of the stop must
comport to the officer’s cited incident giving rise to the stop. O’Neill, supra
note 17, at 760-61.
However, this view fails to compensate for instances where reasonable
suspicion justifies the stop initially, and consent obtained afterward justifies
its extension.
Under Illinois’ pre-Caballes law, consent to search for
contraband would be voided if the initial reason of the stop was unrelated to
contraband. Id. at 752 (explaining pre-Caballes Illinois Supreme Court cases).
It also fails to recognize the rationale for the earliest consent
jurisprudence in Schneckloth. The primary function of consent is the
“legitimate need for [searches in] situations where the police have some
evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest.” Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 227. In such instances, “a search authorized by a valid consent may be
the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.” Id.
68. The doctrine is limited rather than complete because Illinois declines to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court in select portions of their exclusionary rule
jurisprudence. See Matthew S. Wilzbach, Search and Seizure and the Lockstep
Doctrine-Illinois Deviates from the Lockstep Doctrine in Telling the Police That
They Cannot Rely on Illinois’ Laws, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 181, 187 (1997)
(explaining that Illinois followed a pure lockstep doctrine before the adoption
of its current constitution in 1970, which only deviates from the Federal
Constitution by disallowing “good faith reliance” as an exception to the
exclusionary rule). Compare People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604, 611-12 (Ill.
1996) (rejecting a good faith reliance on statutes), with Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 347-49 (1987) (allowing a good faith reliance on statutes).
However, those portions are not at issue in this comment. To date,
Illinois’ adherence to the consent doctrine appears to be a pure and
unwavering lockstep.
69. See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 762, n.144 and 147 (criticizing the Illinois
Supreme Court for employing a limited lockstep approach as their primary
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own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.70
Instead,
Illinois unselectively adopts the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation.71
Lower courts must follow Terry,
Jimeno, and their progeny “lockstep” with the Federal
Constitution because they are bound to the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision-not-to-decide.72
III.ANALYSIS
Between Terry, Jimeno, and the limited lockstep
doctrine, consensual searches during traffic stops need
to be analyzed carefully to determine whether an
obscure place within the vehicle can be searched. Part
III will survey the leading cases and arguments
concerning consent to search obscure places within a
vehicle in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. It
will then provide a discussion of Illinois’ recent decision
in Kats, giving specific focus to whether consent to
search a vehicle extends to those intricate hiding places
discussed above.
A. Following the Hypothetical Cop: A Step-By-Step
Approach to Consent
Because there are several permutations which can
give rise to a consensual search, each being legally
relevant, a sample hypothetical is offered. Assume a
hypothetical
police
officer,
Detective
Martin
McFadden,73 pulls you over for a traffic violation. In
the first place, the initial stop was almost certainly
legal, even without knowing McFadden’s rationale.74
McFadden approaches the vehicle, and asks you for
principle to dismantle any additional protections courts in Illinois could use to
add to the Fourth Amendment).
70. Id.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 44-45 (Ill. 2006)
(incorporating lockstep as a legal principle to be followed in Illinois’ Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence).
71. Wilzbach, supra note 68.
72. See People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Ill. 1984) (holding that
warrantless searches under Article I, §6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution are
governed by cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, because language in the two provisions is so similar).
73. Detective McFadden is the actual officer from Terry v. Ohio, who
arguably pioneered “stop and frisk” techniques before Chief Justice Warren
had an opportunity to do so. 392 U.S. at 5.
74. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 (holding that police can constitutionally
arrest a suspect for nearly any traffic violation); Whren, 517 U.S. at 813
(holding that probable cause for any minor traffic violation is sufficient,
irrespective of the officer’s subjective intent); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (holding
that police only need a small modicum of suspicion that criminal activity is
“afoot” to affect a Terry stop).
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your license and registration.75 During that time he is
free to check any outstanding warrants you may have,
the legitimacy of your license, etc.76 Remember, the
only way he can violate Terry’s brevity prong here is by
taking too much time.77 Thus, timing is crucial to an
appropriate consent request.
1. The Timing of the Consent Request
At this point, one can envision two scenarios. On
one hand, McFadden might inquire for consent during
his allotted “diligent” search time; that is, the time it
would take a diligent officer to “dispel any suspicion” of
wrongdoing without “measurably extending the
duration of the stop.”78 On the other, the stop itself
might violate Terry for taking too long, at which point
McFadden has yet another fork in the road. He could
either [1] ask for consent to search your vehicle
anyways,79 or [2] clearly end the stop and request
75. See Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish:
Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843,
1874-98 (2004) (explaining that asking for a license and registration during a
traffic stop is not only routine, but indeed constitutionally proper).
76. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (holding that police
are free to make “inquiries unrelated to the stop, so long as those inquiries do
not measurably extend” the stop).
77. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685 (1985) (holding that the time taken need only be commensurate with
the amount of time needed for police to “diligently pursue a means of
investigation” likely to “dispel their suspicions quickly”).
In Sharpe, the police were following a Pontiac and a Camper driving in
tandem. Id. at 675. The police attempted to stop both cars but the Pontiac
took evasive maneuvers. Id. It was about 20 minutes after the stop before
officers caught up with the Pontiac, and returned to the Camper. Id. at 682.
A subsequent search of the camper returned drugs. Id. at 679. The court held
that this was not a violation of Terry, because it was reasonable to take more
time with an evasive accomplice. Id. at 683. Moreover, that police need not
undertake “the fastest” means of investigation, only means “reasonably aimed”
at ending the investigation quickly. Id. at 685. The Court could not say, on
the facts of Sharpe, that the stop was “unreasonable,” albeit, not the fastest
possible means. Id.
78. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01
(2005). See also supra Part II.B.2, notes 50-53 (discussing Caballes’ mandate
that police activity conducted during a lawful detention, which does not itself
violate the Fourth Amendment, by definition cannot exceed the scope of an
otherwise permissible traffic stop).
Indeed, what could be more fitting than a brief request to “cut to the
chase” and search a suspect’s vehicle where police are commanded to use
methods “diligently aimed at dispelling the officers suspicions in the shortest
period of time”? Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
79. See United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir.
1994) (comparing cases where consent was obtained moments after an illegal
seizure to cases where consent was obtained as much as forty-five minutes
after an automobile was stopped).
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consent after its conclusion.80
Where McFadden remains within his allotted
“diligent” search time there is no violation of Terry
because there is no independent Fourth Amendment
violation.81 However, the situation is less clear in the
latter case, where a Terry violation occurred.
In Ohio v. Robinette,82 the Court appeared to
approve of an officer’s asking for consent after ending a
Terry stop, but narrowed its holding.83
However,
several courts argue that when the police ask for
consent during a stop whose scope violates Terry, the
police’s requisition stands as a violation of the
Poisonous Fruit doctrine (i.e., that the initial illegal
search “taints” related subsequent searches as “fruit of
the poisonous tree”).84 When the doctrine is applied to
consensual vehicle stops, lower courts are divided as to
whether an illegal vehicle stop which preceded consent
(or was contemporaneous to obtaining it) “taints” the
subsequent search or is “purged” for being too
“attenuated.”85
Some courts argue that the length of the stop prior
to obtaining consent is irrelevant, even in
circumstances where the “detention” violated Terry.86
80. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (holding that a stop had
ended once an officer handed suspect back his license and registration and
that further warnings that the suspect was free to go were not required, so
subsequent request for consent did not violate the scope of the stop); People v.
Cosby, 898 N.E. 2d 603, 612 (Ill. 2008) (holding that the end of a traffic stop is
canonized by an officer’s return to the defendant of his license, registration,
and other paperwork).
81. See cases cited supra note 78 (discussing the proper time period and
level of inquiry during a routine traffic stop).
82. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38.
83. Id. at 38. The Court held that consent was appropriately gained, but
only analyzed whether the officer was mandated to tell Robinette he was “free
to go,” not whether the timing of consent was appropriate. Id.
84. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963) (holding that
an initial illegal search taints subsequent related searches). However, not all
events after the initial search are tainted; Certain subsequent consented-to
events can “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” See id. at 491
(holding illegal search tainted testimony against defendant could not bar
defendant’s subsequent and voluntary confession). See also Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365
(1972); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (holding that the
factors considered to determine whether confession was validly obtained after
an illegal arrest include: “[1] the temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, [2] the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, [3]
the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct”).
85. See Melendez-Garcia, 28 F. 3d at 1054; Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38;
Cosby, 898 N.E.2d at 612 (all discussing requests for consent to search before
and after the stop has ended).
86. See Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 346 (Schmidt J., concurring) (arguing that if
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Indeed, once the encounter has ended, how can any
subsequently obtained consent be anything but an
unrelated new encounter?87 And, even if police concede
such a technical and minor intrusion88 did take place, it
may not be subject to exclusion at all.89
Alternatively, other courts argue that if the
detention violated Terry, it is a near per se indication
that the consent was obtained illegally.90 Indeed, if
Terry’s second prong is relegated only to timing
infractions by Caballes, timing violations should not be
ignored. Moreover, Terry focused on a seemingly
“minor” infraction and refused to define a “seizure” as
anything less than “restraint on an individual to walk
away.”91 Justice Stevens has even argued that a
principal problem with both views is they presuppose
that, just because a stop has a clear beginning, it also
has a clear ending.92
police effectively end the seizure, consent may be legally obtained afterwards,
despite a later finding that the initial seizure itself was illegal).
87. Id.
88. As Professor LaFave notes, “it typically takes little time to obtain
consent.” LaFave, supra note 75, at 1892. For example, it would only take 3-4
seconds to ask the defendant, “May I search your vehicle for drugs, weapons,
or other contraband?”.
89. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-98, 602 (2006) (holding that
even an concededly illegal intrusion may be so de minimis as to escape
exclusion under the Fourth Amendment; although, it may still succumb to a
§1983 suit); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) (per curiam)
(holding that the government’s interest in officer safety outweighs the “de
minimis” intrusion of ordering a passenger out of a motor vehicle “once [it] has
been lawfully detained for a traffic violation”).
90. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2010)
(collecting cases). See also Reid M. Bolton, Comment, The Legality of
Prolonged Traffic Stops After Herring: Brief Delays As Isolated Negligence, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1795-97 (2009) (advocating for a bright line, “no
prolongation” rule where consent may not be obtained after the stop has
ended); LaFave, supra note 75, at 1892 (arguing that “any consent obtained
will not be valid if the request came after the traffic stop had or should have
run its course”).
However, even Professor LaFave quickly cautions that despite the
technical infraction, “courts are inclined to validate consent requests that
immediately follow completion of all other traffic-stop activities.” LaFave,
supra note 75, at 1982.
91. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-18 (reasoning that even minimally intrusive
acts no matter how brief can still amount to a “seizure,” and rejecting the
notion that the Fourth Amendment only applies to “technical arrest[s]” which
“eventuate in a trip to the station house”). See also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 47
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that a request for consent to search
restrains an individual’s freedom to walk away because “[t]he question itself
sought an answer ‘before you get gone’”) (emphasis in original).
92. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 46-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (examining
the totality of the circumstances rather than applying a bright-line rule or
litmus-paper test).
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In the end, courts split the difference: a request for
consent which violates Terry is presumptively tainted,
unless police can show they clearly ended the stop.93 A
request for consent after the stop has clearly ended,
without more, does not taint a search merely because it
was temporarily close to a Terry violation.94 Yet,
consent obtained within an amount of time deemed
unreasonable under the second prong of Terry will be
fruit of the poisonous tree causally connected to the
Terry violation.95
2. The Nature of the Consent Colloquially & Resulting
Scope
Assuming Officer McFadden’s consent request was
made within an appropriate time frame, what does an
appropriate exchange of valid consent look like?
In the simplest example, Officer McFadden may
request your consent by saying, “May I have permission
to search your vehicle?” However, when you respond in
the affirmative, it is unlikely that you have given an
all-encompassing general consent rather than a more
limited one.96 If McFadden wants a broader consent, he
must ask for your consent to search the vehicle for
something.97 And, if the search involves an obscure
93. See Everett, 601 F.3d at 492 (rejecting a bright-line “no-prolongation”
rule and surveying related cases).
94. See id. (arguing that such a construction, although logical, is too
précising and ignores the overarching principle of reasonableness mandated in
the text of the amendment).
95. At the very least, violating Terry can be used as an indication that
consent was obtained in an objectively unreasonable fashion, when the time
taken becomes a “show of authority.” See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543, 550 (1968) (arguing that a “show of authority” by the officer can
invalidate seemingly voluntary consent because such consent is “instinct with
coercion” and actually involuntary); People v. Cosby, 898 N.E.2d 603, 613
(2008) (citing People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1999)) (noting officers
“flanking” a car can create an unreasonable seizure while asking for consent
because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave).
96. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (holding that the “scope of a search is
generally defined by its expressed object”).
97. Id. Indeed, proving the scope of consent is the burden of the
government at trial. United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.
2002).
Thus, without stating exactly what they are looking for, the
government may not be able to justify opening compartments whose contents
are not “routinely opened or accessed.” See State v. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d
901, 905 (Or. App. Ct. 1994) (arguing that a defendant’s silence or general
consent does not extend to a search behind a door panel unless the police
specifically identified, as the object of their search, an item which would fit in
such a place). But see Melendez, 301 F.3d at 33 (arguing that police may not
open sealed containers when the consent is merely to “look around” but can
dismantle a stereo speaker by unscrewing the sub-woofer so long as there was
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area of a vehicle (such as behind a door panel), the
object named must be small enough to be at least
capable of fitting there.98
But even assuming McFadden timely asserts this
verbal boilerplate,99 how can a search of the bowels of
your vehicle be within your consent when all that
occurs is the following colloquy:
McFadden: May I have you permission to search
your vehicle for drugs, weapons, or other contraband?
You: Yes.100
a. Majority Argument
A majority say that so long as the suspect
consented to a search “for contraband,” peeling off
paneling is acceptable as a corollary of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on searching containers in
automobiles.101 That jurisprudence states that “[w]hen
a legitimate search is under way . . . nice
distinctions . . .
between
glove
compartments,
upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages . . .
must give way to the interest in the prompt and
efficient completion of the task at hand.”102
no damage and the speaker was put back into good working order).
98. This is the primary command of Jimeno’s objective reasonableness test
as a limiting principle, and the one place of agreement among both sides of the
debate. Compare Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419-20 (holding that scope of consent
did not extend to areas within a vehicle’s door panel, even though stated object
was capable of being located there), with Zapata, 180 F.3d at 1243 (holding
that scope of consent did extend to areas within a vehicle’s door panel because
the stated object was capable of being located there).
Both sides also agree that, at a minimum, damage to the property being
searched is a floor to the defendant’s consent. See Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at
905 (rejecting the state’s argument that damage to property is the only
limitation on his prior consent).
99. Indeed, some courts discussed the application of contract principles to
resolve the exchange. See Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 at 906 n.2 (Haselton, J.,
concurring) (arguing that police should not be able to escape obtaining actual
consent by “cast[ing] requests for consent in the broadest and most ambiguous
of terms,” but should instead be forced to specifically identify where they want
to search and noting that the risk of ambiguity rests with the draftsman in the
civil context).
100. Indeed, that such exchanges can relinquish consent to search behind a
door panel has been called an “unacceptable burden-shifting gambit.” Id. at
906 (Haselton, J., concurring). See also State v. Swanson, 838 P.2d 1340, 1345
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasizing defendant’s refusal to sign a consent form
and finding statements such as “go ahead” and “I can’t stop you” did not
encompass “tearing a car apart” using a special tool to pry open a defendants
door panel).
101. See Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 344 (discussing the split).
102. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925) (authorizing police to tear up upholstery to conduct a warrantless
search for contraband, under the automobile exception).
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In United States v. Ross,103 police searched a
suspect’s trunk.104 Upon finding a brown paper bag,
police opened it, and found drugs later admitted into
evidence at Ross’ trial.105 The Court held the search
was valid (based on probable cause), but made two
distinct efforts to extend Ross beyond its facts.106 First,
the Court said its reasoning would not have changed
given the type of container: both a footlocker and a
brown paper bag were of equal status under the Fourth
Amendment.107
Second, the Court posited that
“[a]rguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its
upholstery) could be searched without a warrant.”108
Ross reinforces the majority’s proposition that the scope
of a legitimate search is quite broad and police need not
draw lines between consoles, glove boxes, or indeed
door paneling.
In addition to Ross, a majority of lower courts argue
that the defendant, who is free to place restrictions on
his consent and has knowledge of the contraband
secreted, has created his own dilemma by his failure to
tailor his consent.109
These courts urge that the
“defendant, as the individual ‘knowing the contents of
the vehicle,’ has the ‘responsibility to limit the scope of
the consent.’”110 Finally, the majority contends that we
need not be committed to an overly detailed form of
legal realism; although the Fourth Amendment grants
defendant’s a “right to be let alone,” it does not
guarantee the most effective use of that right.111
103. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
104. Id. at 801.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 816-22.
107. Id. at 821 n.28. The Court held that the scope of the search must
extend to sealed containers within cars because any smaller a scope would
actually breed intrusion, rather than diminish it. Id. Police would be forced to
detain passengers while sorting through “worthy” containers. Id.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1995) (arguing
that a “failure to object to breadth of search indicates that search was within
scope of consent” where officers unscrewed the face of air vents and interior
panels to find hidden money); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a failure to protest when officers used a key to unlock
defendant’s trunk indicated the search was within the scope of his consent).
110. See United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1993)) (holding that even an
officer’s failure to delineate the “express object” of his search is not dispositive
where defendant failed to affirmatively delineate limitations on the search and
police subsequently searched under the hood of the vehicle).
111. In Schneckloth, the Court stated:
the Fourth Amendment is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth.
The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment stand as a protection of quite
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Indeed, such realism would inadvertently take into
account the defendant’s guilt, lowering Jimeno’s
reasonable innocent person test to accommodate the
defendant’s subjective apprehensions and guilt.112 In
sum, the majority argues that the combination of the
Ross’ scope and the defendant’s willing compliance end
Fourth Amendment protections.
b. Minority Argument
Despite the abject premise of arguing against a
search the defendant himself expressly approved, the
minority also give compelling arguments. In cases very
similar to the one that recently confronted Illinois,113
courts have held that if reasonableness is a limiting
principle at all, it must exclude those areas not
“routinely accessible.”114
In State v. Arroyo-Sotelo,115 Officer Anderson pulled
over Arroyo for a traffic violation.116 After Anderson
issued a warning and ended the encounter, telling
Arroyo that he was free to go, he asked Arroyo if there
were any drugs, weapons, or cash in the car.117 Arroyo
said no, and freely volunteered his consent to a
search.118 Based upon his experience, Anderson knew
narcotics traffickers hid drugs in paneling, so he
removed two screws on the passenger door, pried open
the paneling, and discovered large amounts of cash and
stacks of cocaine.119
The entire stop took 15-20
different constitutional values — values reflecting the concern of our
society for the right of each individual to be let alone. To recognize this
is no more than to accord those values undiluted respect (internal
citations omitted).
412 U.S. at 242. In this respect, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are
very different from Miranda Warnings or the Right to Council. Id.
112. See cases cited supra note 62 (explaining that the “reasonable person”
test presupposes an innocent person). But see California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991) (accommodating reality by noting that it is only “[t]he
wicked [who] flee” when being pursued).
113. Compare Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905 (holding that consent does not
extend to behind door paneling), with Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 345 (holding that
consent does extend to behind door paneling).
114. See Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905 (stating that “[a]bsent specific facts
to suggest otherwise, a general consent to search a car does not authorize an
officer to search areas of a car that are not designed to be routinely opened or
accessed”).
115. State v. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d 901 (Or. App. Ct. 1994).
116. Id. at 902.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
Indeed, officers often cite the commonplace nature of secreting drugs
within door paneling as the premier justification for special procedures and
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minutes.120
The court found for Arroyo.121 They reasoned that
whether the items expressed as the object of the search
(such as drugs or weapons) might fit within the door
panel
is
irrelevant.122
Jimeno’s
“objective
reasonableness” test requires more than the place be
capable of housing contraband. Instead, the court
reasoned, the area must be “routinely accessible,”123 or
likely to house contraband.124
Others in the minority reject the majority’s idea
that cases like Ross and Carroll endorse an allencompassing consent, arguing that each of those cases
were based on probable cause rather than consent.125
Instead, they argue that Jimeno, unlike Ross, does in
fact distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy”
containers.126

tools used to remove door paneling quickly, without damage. See Swanson,
838 P.2d at 1343, 1345-48 nn.6-7 (stating that the use of a “slim jim,” a
specialized tool used to dismantle door panels, was appropriate because “it
was common knowledge in law enforcement that drugs are often secreted
behind car door panels” and “the standard operating procedure of the officers
[to] pop all door panels when permission to search is obtained”)
120. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 902.
121. Id. at 905.
122. See id. (rejecting the argument that an officer may search an area
merely because it is physically capable of housing the express object of an
officer’s search). In Arroyo-Sotelo, the court reasoned that:
the scope of the consent [does not include] any area where a specified
item might be found. For example, if a suspect has narcotics hidden
inside a spare tire, that spare tire becomes an area where narcotics
“might” be found. However, a reasonable person would not understand
the suspect’s general consent to search the car as authorizing an officer
to slash the spare tire and investigate its contents. (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)
Id. at 905 n.3
123. Whether an area was “routinely accessible” turns upon how hard the
officer had to work to get into the compartment. See id. (holding that because
the officer had to “remove two screws and pry a panel away from the sidewall”
the area searched was not “routinely accessible”).
124. Id. at 905. In fact, the Arroyo Court argued that any other area would
require additional consent. Id.
125. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (holding that probable cause justified the
search of “every part of [a] vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search”); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155 (holding that probable cause justified
cutting open defendants upholstery).
126. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (stating that it “is very likely
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk,
has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk,” but
probably has consented to the search of “a closed paper bag” in his trunk).
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B. Thorough Breakdown of Kats
Illinois recently had an opportunity to address each
of the issues above – timing, nature, and scope of
consent – in Kats. In Kats, police pulled over Kats for a
failure to properly merge.127 Over the course of the
stop, the officer, Officer Thulen, who had nearly 20
years of experience, became suspicious of Kats.128 Both
men went back to the squad car to issue a ticket, and
run a “routine” background check, which revealed that
Kats had a criminal record.129 Nine minutes into the
stop, Thulen issued Kats a ticket, returned his
paperwork, and told him that he was “free to go,” before
asking if Kats “had anything illegal in the car” and
requesting consent to search “for contraband,” to which
Kats replied “yes.”130 After Thulen’s initial search
proved unfruitful, he returned to the squad car,
grabbed a screwdriver and an upholstery tool in front of
Kats,131 returned to the car and pried open a partially
loose flap of the door panel.132 Peering into the door
panel Thulen uncovered several plastic wrapped
bundles containing over seven pounds of marijuana.133
127. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 338.
128. Id. The officer who pulled over Kats, Officer Thulen, had 19 years on
the job, 10 of which were spent with a canine unit. Id. He testified that “his
training, [experience,] and the observations made from the beginning of the
traffic stop led him to believe that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 339.
Thulen’s observations included Kats’ California driver’s license, and the fact
that Kats was driving a rental car, a Toyota Sequoia SUV, with a mattress in
the back. Id.
129. Id. at 338. Thulen’s check revealed that Kats had an FBI number. Id.
An FBI number is a number assigned to suspected criminals in a national
data bank maintained by the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
National Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
130. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 338-39. After Kats exited the squad car and began
back towards his vehicle, “Thulen said ‘Sir?’ [and Kats] turned around started
walking back toward Thulen.” Id. Thulen told him that “the traffic stop was
over and that he was free to go [but] asked if he could ask a few questions.”
Id.
131. The trial court’s holding was silent on the fact that Kats remained in
Thulen’s squad car for the duration of the search, a fact that cuts both ways.
On the one hand, Kats could have argued that because he could not see what
Thulen was doing, he was restrained from limiting the scope of his consent.
See Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905 (arguing that defendant could not properly
limit his consent where he was not in the line of sight of the officer’s search).
On the other, Kats was in perfect position to see Thulen recover the tools after
the initial search proved unfruitful. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 339.
132. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 339.
133. Id. Kats argued that use of the tools violated his consent, but the trial
court disagreed. Id. at 340. The trial court held that the search was proper
because “remov[ing] dashboard and door panels that could be easily put back
into place is ‘routinely done.’” Id. The court “couldn’t imagine that the courts
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The Appellate Court upheld Thulen’s search.134
First, the court held that requesting consent after a
lawful seizure did not unreasonably prolong the stop or
itself constitute a seizure because Officer Thulen made
it clear that the stop had ended.135 The court went on to
hold that the nature of the consent request was well
within the bounds of Jimeno.136 The scope of the search
did not violate the scope of Kats’ consent because
Thulen properly identified that he was looking for
drugs (an object small enough to fit where Thulen
looked) and all items removed were easily replaced.137
The use of tools was not dispositive where Thulen only
used them to peer into a crevasse created by a prying
motion.138 In sum, Kats holds that a careful and well
trained officer can unilaterally create a nearly
unlimited search, with careful timing and choice of
words, so long as the party searched consents. For the
reasons that follow, Kats was rightly decided.
Certainly Kats itself opens the door to the dangers
of discriminatory pretextual traffic stops.139 However,
that “danger” is little more than the ordinary risk
associated with presuming the legitimacy of police
investigations, which is patently acceptable under
Schneckloth,140 the Supreme Court’s bedrock consent
case, and undeniably affirmed by Whren.141 Moreover,
would hamstring police officers” into only searching areas revealed to the
naked eye because “it would just be a green light to anyone who wants to
traffic.” Id.
134. Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 342.
136. Id. at 344. Officer Thulen’s line of questioning was sufficiently similar
to the hypothetical colloquy above to relate to the reasonable observer that he
would be searching behind paneling for small illicit items. Id. The court held
that Thulen’s mention of illegal items and request to search for contraband
identified an appropriate object to search within paneling by “revealing a
suspicion of specific criminal activity.” Id. at 343.
137. Id. at 344. The Court rejected the “routinely accessed” principle
asserted by other courts, and instead opted for an “easily replaced principle.”
Compare Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905 (holding that consent did not extend
to a search behind a vehicle’s door panel because that area could not be
“routinely accessed”), with Melendez, 301 F.3d at 33 (holding that police can
dismantle a stereo speaker by unscrewing the sub-woofer so long as there was
no damage and the speaker could be easily put back into good working order).
138. See Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 344 (stating that Officer Thulen only used the
tools to peer into a part of the door panel which was “already slightly ajar”).
139. The defendant in Kats was pulled over for failure to properly merge.
Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 338.
140. See supra notes 63 and 67 (explaining that Schneckloth primarily
authorizes consent stops because they are a useful tool of law enforcement and
essential to the efficient administration of justice).
141. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the
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the line between pretextual police work and good police
work becomes a very fine one.142 Police officers often
have significant experience allowing them to notice the
finest details in a matter of moments.143
But, pretext or not, the defendant maintains
significant protections after the stop has occurred;
specifically those concerning the timing of the request.
As Kats correctly held, where a stop violates Terry’s
brevity prong, any consent obtained is invalid, absent a
clear indication from the officer that the stop had
ended.144 Kats demonstrates the perfect balance struck
by the current regime between the efficiency and
legitimacy of police investigations on the one hand, and
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights on the other.
Under the existing edifice, once a stop violates Terry’s
brevity prong an officer is encouraged [1] to clearly end
the stop by handing back the defendant’s license and
telling him he is free to go145 and [2] to establish the
scope of the search by itemizing either the places he
intends to go or objects he seeks to find.146 Thus,
between timing and scope, defendants already have two
very powerful protections: notice of the search and an
autonomous opportunity to reject the officer’s request.
Nevertheless, minority courts like Arroyo argue
that the scope of a consensual search should be
narrowed to places “likely to house contraband.”147 For
two reasons this misses the point and fundamentally
subjective motives of police are irrelevant to traffic stops).
142. What may seem strange to you and I but not necessarily sinister, can
be a red flag to a well-trained officer. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419 (citing
mismatched door handles as suspicious).
143. See supra notes 119 and 128 (citing cases illustrating officers who
relied on their experience to find drugs in obscure areas in vehicles).
144. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 342.
145. Id. The court in Katz emphatically held that the stop, which lasted
only nine minutes of the seventeen minute encounter, was not “unreasonably
long.” Id. at 338-39, 343. But even if it was, the court foreclosed any
poisonous tree argument because “the traffic stop ended when Thulen gave the
defendant the ticket, and Thulen’s subsequent search of the defendant’s
vehicle was not part of the traffic stop.” Id. at 342 (emphasis added). Even if
the stop in Kats had violated Terry’s brevity prong, Kats’ argument failed
because Thulen’s positive affirmation that “the stop had ended” and that Kats
was “free to go” by handing him his license back, purged any taint resulting
from the unreasonable seizure. Id. See also id. at 346 (Schmidt J.,
concurring) (calling the length of the stop prior to obtaining consent
completely “irrelevant” and without “any bearing” on whether subsequent
consent was lawfully obtained unless police conduct after the stop constituted
a second seizure).
146. See supra Part II.B.3.b. (discussing Jimeno’s command that the police
identify the object of their search).
147. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905.

2013]

Clever Contraband

449

misunderstands the relationship between probable
cause and consent. First, Ross extends to consent
searches. If anything, a consensual search should be
broader in scope than one based on probable cause
because a frank and express request from police serves
the interest of justice more than an undisclosed motive
guised as probable cause, easily concealed in
hindsight.148 The former is preferable to the latter and
should be encouraged.149
Second, even if the scope of a consensual search is
narrower than Ross, what is “routinely accessible” goes
too far the other direction. In Arroyo, the court defined
“routinely accessible” as those areas likely to house
contraband.150 However, what is “likely” expresses a
level of suspicion reserved for probable cause, expressly
rejected in consent analysis.151 The main virtue of
consent analysis is the absence of any suspicion
requirement.152 Without a principled basis, using what
is
“routinely
accessible”
as
a
limitation
overcompensates by protecting a defendant from being
inconvenienced at the expense of legitimate police
work.
IV. PROPOSAL
The opinion in Kats, addressing timing, nature, and
scope of the consent stop, is correct both legally and
ethically. The regularity in which drug trafficking on
our nation’s highways takes place makes consent
148. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-28 (arguing that consensual
cooperation with the police from the community serves both the interests of
justice and the efficacy of law enforcement, as citizens have an interests in the
effective enforcement of laws)
149. Id. at 228.
150. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905.
151. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-84 (1990) (explaining that
consent searches are always “reasonable” searches, which by definition cannot
be governed by the Fourth Amendment so there is no basis of authority for the
Court to require anything more from police, once consent is established).
Although no modicum of suspicion is required, resource constraints already
ensure that officers are likely have some suspicion before searching obscure
areas in a vehicle. Departments are not likely funded well enough to be
routinely dismantling every vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. See Oren
Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1673 (2012) (explaining that numerous indiscriminate consent searches
would be nearly impossible “from a human resources perspective,” because
there are more than fifty million traffic stops in the United States per year
and, as a routine part of each stop, officers perform a multitude of tasks
including calling headquarters, running license and registrations, as well as
warrant and criminal record checks).
152. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-84.
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searches a necessary weapon in law enforcement’s
arsenal.153
Yet, a proper consent search contains
daunting logistical permutations, happens in a matter
of minutes, and occurs with such frequency, that
exacting guidelines are required to keep in line with
the Court’s current jurisprudence while searching the
obscure areas of a defendant’s vehicle.
This section proposes a short but effective checklist
based upon the above review of case law. Where the
object is a peek inside a defendant’s clever roadside
hiding place, a simple checklist can help navigate
officers through the minefield created by Jimeno and
its progeny, and guide them safely to an admissible
search. The list that follows will reduce Kats’ legal
effect to a short set of commands toward officers in the
field, on how best to effectuate a consent stop while
remaining within the bounds of current jurisprudence.
A. Using the Latitude Given By The Supreme Court:
Exacting Guidelines For Police In The Field To
Effectuate Legitimate Consent Searches
To effectuate an appropriate stop, officers need to
[1] be prepared, [2] ask properly, [3] look closely, and
[4] use tactics to hedge their bets. Prosecutors and
departments need to ensure those efforts do not go
unrewarded, by safeguarding admissibility.
1. Be prepared: use a written consent form to gain
consent and bring tools for a potential search
Police can ensure they maximize the likelihood of a
fruitful, legitimate, and admissible search, before even
leaving the station. First, although not required154
police should be equipped with written consent
waivers. Such waivers would serve to avoid confusion,
ensure the object of the search is clearly expressed, and
frustrate any subsequent voluntariness challenges.155
153. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text (discussing the regularity
of drug trafficking on our nation’s highways).
154. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (stating that consent
need only be voluntary, which is determined from the totality of the
circumstances). See also Kevin Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Vehicle
Searches, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (1998) (stating that almost no courts
require written consent, but it is helpful as evidentiary corroboration in a
subsequent voluntariness review).
155. Compare Swanson, 838 P.2d at 1344 (using a colloquy between police
and suspect, which was reduced to writing, to establish whether the police
used the correct language to identify the object of their search), with Berghuis
v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (holding that a writing is not
required in a voluntariness review, but neither is defendant’s refusal to sign
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Second, police should keep tools nearby to pry or peer
into obscure areas. Illinois expressly rejected the
argument in Kats that the use of tools, without more,
went beyond the scope of the defendant’s consent.156
Tools need not be used in every stop157 and police
should be extremely careful not to damage a
defendants property.158 However, on those limited
occasions where tools are needed, their use is not
sufficient to show the scope of defendant’s consent was
violated.159 In Illinois, the proposition is expressly
rejected.160
2. Ask properly: the timing & phraseology of a proper
consent exchange
Once a stop has occurred, even the most
inexperienced officer knows that he is up against the
clock.161 One of the relatively few ways to abate that
clock is a request for consent.162 Thus, police should ask
for consent as early on in the stop as possible. If they
question whether the stop has gone too long,163 they
should make certain to clearly convey to the driver that
the stop has ended, before requesting consent.164 In the
dispositive).
156. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Kats
Court’s rejection of Kats’ argument that the use of a tool violated the scope of
his consent).
157. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420 (explaining that police were able to peer
down a gaping hole in the defendant’s door panel to find drugs because
defendants did such a poor job putting the door panel back together).
158. See Swanson, 838 P.2d at 1345 (holding that police needed additional
consent any time they affected the “structural integrity of a vehicle” using
tools, so an officer’s use of a “slim jim” to pry open the defendant’s door panel
violated the scope of his consent).
159. Jimeno’s test is one of “objective reasonableness” of the exchange
between the officer and the defendant at the time consent was given. Jimeno,
500 U.S. at 251. A suspect-motorist is free to watch the officer as he searches
and has every opportunity to place subsequent limitations on the search after
giving consent. Id. at 250-52.
160. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 344.
161. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (setting the time limit required
to issue a warning, citation, or ticket after Caballes); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408
(modifying Terry to only regulate the time of traffic stops); Berkemer, 468 U.S.
at 439 (applying Terry to traffic stops); Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (limiting the
scope of stops, detentions, and seizures).
162. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (arguing that granting
consent acts as a temporal break in Terry analysis because it provides
independent authority for the duration of the stop).
163. Which is certainly not a clear question by any means. See Sharpe, 470
U.S. at 685 (stating that no “talismanic” period of time defines the appropriate
length of a legal stop).
164. See Part III.A.1, supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing
when to ask for consent and asserting that the only invalid time is [1] after an
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latter case, the driver’s paperwork should be returned,
and they should be told that they are “free to go.”165
Beyond timing, the vernacular of the request is also
important.
Remember that, under the Jimeno
standard, the stated object of the search delineates its
scope and the areas the officer is free to examine.166
Although the language need not match the clarity of an
“oxford don,”167 it should reasonably indicate the object
of the search.168 The request most likely to yield the
broadest scope is one for “drugs, weapons, or other
contraband.”169
3. Look closely: where to search once consent is
obtained
The scope of the resultant search, once consent is
obtained, is any place where the stated object can be
found.170 This is relatively limitless compared to other
unreasonable amount of time under Terry but [2] before the officer has ended
the stop).
165. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (holding that handing back a suspect’s
license and registration completely ended a police stop and that telling a
suspect he was “free to go,” although not constitutionally required, would be
helpful).
166. See Swanson, 838 P.2d 1340, 1345 (holding that consent did not extend
to beyond a door panel where the officer only asked if he could “take a look” in
the vehicle, rather than stating an object of the search capable of being in the
defendant’s door panel).
In Swanson, the officer’s question was even preceded by language that
did express the object of his search. See id. (stating that the officer asked if
there were “guns, large sums of money, or drugs” in the vehicle before asking
to “take a look”); but see Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (rejecting a rigid and
formalistic analysis of whether magic words were linguistically couched in the
same phrase as the request to search and instead requiring a culmination of
all the facts to determine objective reasonableness).
167. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 476 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating that an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right should
not “requir[e] criminal suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford
don”).
168. For instance, in Arroyo-Sotelo, officers did not ask “[suspect], may I
search your vehicle for weapons or contraband.” Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at
902.
Instead,
they
asked
[d]oes
your
vehicle
contain
weapons? . . . drugs? . . . large amounts cash? . . . ; may I search your vehicle.
Id. In fact, Arroyo actually offered the officers the opportunity to search
before the officer could ask. Id.
Cf. id. at 906 (Haselton, J., concurring) (arguing that contract principles
should be used to avoid a “burden shifting gambit” where police can simply
employ magic words to gain access to a defendants entire vehicle). See also
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 379 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the default voluntariness test should require a writing because
police should bear the risk of ambiguity when they stray).
169. Corr, supra note 154, at 9.
170. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
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Fourth Amendment searches,171 with the clear
exception of property damage.172 For several reasons,
the “routinely accessible” scope shaped by a minority of
state courts must fail. Often the compartments are
rigged and retrofitted, makeshift compartments for
quick and easy removal.173 Moreover, that argument
validates the original reason that the defendant
cleverly hid drugs in an obscure area in the first place:
because he thought that no one would look there. This
is a principal policy reason for allowing such searches,
not for frustrating them.174 Indeed, as a policy decision,
we should not legitimize any defendant’s interest in
secreting illegal contraband by constitutionally
protecting the area, especially after the defendant
himself waived such a protection.
4. Hedge your bets during the search: additional
consent, line of sight, and reasonable suspicion and
probable cause
The most crucial time to begin using the
circumstances to bolster an argument that consent was
171. See Corr, supra note 154, at 22-25 tbls. 1-4 (comparing the relative
scope of various types of Fourth Amendment searches, including searches
based on consent, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, full-custody arrest, or
a written policy to inventory a contents after impound).
172. See supra note 98 (discussing property damage as clearly violating the
scope of consent under Jimeno).
173. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419-20 (1990) (explaining that defendants hid
marijuana behind paneling but left door handles and screws off as a crude
engineering design to allow for easy and routine access). See also WBNS,
supra note 13 (explaining that “secret compartments” are routinely
professionally installed in vehicles and intentionally made routinely
accessible).
174. It is well-established that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy
in secreting contraband. See Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (holding that there is no
constitutionally protected interest in the scent of drugs picked up by a canine
unit); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (holding that a cocaine field test which can
only reveal contraband and “no other arguably ‘private’ fact,” does not
implicate any constitutionally recognized privacy interest); Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 438 (holding that the “reasonable person” test which defines whether a
search occurred always presumes an innocent, reasonable person); United
States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that there is no
privacy interest worth protecting in a defendant’s bank statements, even
though he took painstaking efforts to keep the item private by shredding them
so the IRS had to later put them back together like a jigsaw puzzle, because an
intent to keep contraband hidden is not a policy interest worthy of
constitutional protection); But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Florida v.
Jardines,—U.S.—(2013), (No. 11-564) (protesting the proposition that there is
no constitutionally protected interest in contraband because it “just can’t be a
proposition that we can accept [because] it’s just a circular argument” unless it
is coupled with the plain view doctrine and simply means that police have no
duty to avert their eyes when faced with a “smoking gun”).
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properly obtained is during the search itself. Although
none of the following are required, officers should, if
possible: [1] request additional consent to search
obscure areas; [2] stay in the suspect’s line of sight
while searching; and [3] gather enough particularized
suspicion to support a search based on probable cause
or reasonable suspicion.
Additional consent reinforces the proposition that
the search of the obscure area, even one outside
Jimeno’s scope, was subsequently made the explicit
subject of the search and brought into the reasonable
contemplation of the parties.
For the same reason, officers should remain in the
suspect’s line of sight while conducting the search.175 A
primary rationale for Jimeno’s relatively broad scope is
that defendants are always free to affirmatively dictate
the scope of their consent by articulating itemized
limitations.176 That rationale might fail, unless the
officer is within the suspect’s line of sight while
conducting the search.177
Admittedly, the drawback of such tactics is that
they increase the likelihood that defendant will put a
limitation on his consent. In the event that consent is
revoked or narrowed, police have three alternatives.
First, where consent is specifically narrowed by the
defendant, police can still peer down any open
crevasse.178 If this “peering” reveals objects, probable
cause can provide the basis for a search with equal or
175. Indeed, even the most restrictive minority cases agree that further
admonishments, after consent is initially obtained, are not required because a
failure to put any limitation on a search while it is being conducted is nearly
always dispositive that the suspect’s consent extended to the area searched.
Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905. That is, a defendant’s silence during a search
behind his door panel shows that his consent did in fact extend to the area
behind the door panel. Id. However, the same does not hold true where the
defendant was not in line of sight and thus could not see the area being
searched. Id.
176. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
177. Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905. For instance, suspects are unlikely to
affirmatively limit the scope of the search upfront where the area to be
excluded is an obscure area, such as behind a door panel. Id. It would simply
defy reason: “sure officer, you can search everywhere in my car except behind
the door panel of the driver’s side door.” Although legally a defendant is free
to place such restrictions under Bostick and Jimeno, common sense dictates
otherwise.
178. Compare Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1419 (holding that consent to search a
vehicle justified flashing a light down a crevice between the window and the
door panel, exposing gray packages, and providing probable cause to remove
the panel); with Swanson, 838 P.2d at 1343 (holding that search was not
justified by consent where officers pried open door panel without citing any
particular reason for doing so).
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greater scope than the initial consent.179 Second, where
consent is revoked, police can convey an intent to
summon a canine unit to sniff the defendant’s vehicle
while a ticket is being issued.180 If the suspect appears
anxious, a canine unit may indeed be worthwhile. If
not, a further search may prove fruitless, saving time
and resources.
Finally, police may be able to ignore a request for
further consent where reasonable suspicion or probable
cause crops up during the course of a consent search.181
Certainly, reasonable suspicion is not required.182 The
primary virtue of the consent analysis is that it has
never required any modicum of suspicion.183 However,
reasonable suspicion or probable cause can provide
auxiliary authority to search the vehicle if consent is
revoked or a court later finds that the defendant’s
consent did not include the area searched.184 As they
179. See supra note 37 (establishing that the scope of a search based on
facts giving rise to probable cause is at least as broad as a search based on a
warrant founded on those same facts).
180. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (holding that police
deception, without more, doesn’t in itself amount to a cognizable constitutional
violation); Corr, supra note 154, at 8 (asserting that officers should request a
canine unit where consent is refused or revoked); but see Florida v. Harris, 132
S.Ct. 1796 (2012) (granting certiorari on whether a roadside sniff of a vehicle
by a canine unit constitutes a “search”).
181. See Corr, supra note 154, at 12 (explaining that, in using a “consent
search, other search exceptions may come into play during the course of the
stop,” such as probable cause).
182. Indeed, the contrary position – that a search of the inner most bowels
of a defendant’s vehicle cannot be supported by consent, but requires some
degree of suspicion – is the proposition asserted by a minority of courts. See
Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 905 (“[a]bsent specific facts to suggest otherwise, a
general consent to search a car does not authorize an officer to search
[obscure] areas of a car”). Yet, this argument utterly fails to explain why an
item seen within an obscure area without removing any component of the
vehicle is within the scope of the defendants consent. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at
1419 (holding that mismatched door handles yielded sufficient suspicion to
peer down the crack of a door panel without touching it, and visual inspection
of packages inside the panel yielded more suspicion, sufficient to remove the
panel).
Rather, an object in plain view, seen without moving, adjusting, or
touching anything within the vehicle, is always within the scope of a search,
and does not require any suspicion whatsoever. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan J., concurring) (explaining that “objects [exposed] to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders are not protected” by the Fourth Amendment). And, if not excluded
from the Fourth Amendment by the “plain view” doctrine, Jimeno’s objective
reasonableness test must, if anything, go far enough to exclude such objects.
183. See sources cited supra note 151 (discussing the chief advantage of
consent searches are that they do not require either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause).
184. See Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420 (holding that peering into the panel
without touching it provided probable cause to search the panel, although
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are lawfully searching, police should become alert to
facts such as loose screws,185 open flaps,186 or
mismatched handles, knobs, or locks.187
5. Ensure Admissibility: in the courthouse and at the
police station
Finally, the proper consent search does not end at
the roadside.
Police departments should create
procedures
to
provide
for
inter-departmental
punishment when and where the above procedures are
not followed. Such procedures may serve to avoid
exclusion of evidence obtained during the search when
the abuse is a minor - though a technical – violation of
the Fourth Amendment.188 Moreover, prosecutors must
take advantage of the “lockstep doctrine,” thrusting it
on Illinois Courts, not as just a rationale for following
the United States Supreme Court in certain instances,
but as a command of the Illinois Supreme Court in all
instances.189
V. CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Constitution would not have
shrugged their shoulders at the difference between
prying open a door panel was not within the scope of the defendants consent);
Strickland, 902 F.2d at 942 (holding that although consent to search did not
include slashing open defendants tire, information gathered during the legal
portions of the search did provide probable cause for slashing open the tires).
See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155 (holding that probable cause to search
defendant’s vehicle allowed police to cut into the upholstery); Ross, 456 U.S. at
825 (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle extends to every part of
that vehicle). But see State v. Murray, 376 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1977) (noting
in dictum that any search which “interferes with the structural integrity of the
vehicle itself is fatally excessive in its scope” where officers noticed drugs on
the dashboard and subsequently searched the car by removing the front seat);
State v. Acosta, 801 P.2d 489, 493 (1990) (holding that no amount of
reasonable suspicion could ever justify a search as intrusive as removing a
screwed in panel in a vehicle).
185. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420.
186. Kats, 967 N.E.2d at 339.
187. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1420.
188. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598 (2006) (arguing that violation of knock
and announce does not warrant exclusion because, using the Leon cost-benefit
analysis, inter-departmental reprimand is sufficient to deter such de minimis
violations). But see Whren 517 U.S. at 816, (rejecting the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment inquiry could ever turn on whether an inter-departmental
regulation was followed).
189. Compare O’Neill, supra note 17, at 757 (requiring that the elaborate
edifice Illinois constructed on the permissible scope of a Terry Stop in Caballes
be torn down in favor of the Supreme Court’s timing rule in Caballes II), with
Arroyo-Sotelo, 884 P.2d at 903 (relying on the Oregon Constitution but
construing Federal Fourth Amendment law).
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banning certain “unreasonable” searches, and allowing
those same searches at the voluntary election of an
autonomous individual – neither should we. No matter
how broad the scope of a consent search is, it only
exists under several strata of other protections.190 After
all the protections already afforded, if the defendant
doesn’t have the wherewithal to say “no,” he should not
be able to turn to the Constitution for solace. Given
this great authority, law enforcement has a duty to use
it ethically, responsibly, economically, and without
abuse; but above all, they must take special care to use
it effectively, to avoid unnecessary exclusion.

190. Indeed, authority figures are relegated to “requests” to conduct
searches because a great multitude of other relatively harmless procedures are
prophylactically outlawed. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337-39
(2000) (holding that merely feeling the outside of a passenger’s luggage, as
other passengers or baggage handlers would, constituted a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (holding
that a thermal imaging device which could only detect heat surrounding a
home rather than within the home, constituted a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (holding that GPS tracking of a vehicle
which was unknown to the owner for over a month and did not affect the
vehicle’s appearance or functionality constituted a search (or seizure) under
the Fourth Amendment).
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